The Tower of Basel – Do We Want the Bank For International Settlements Issuing Our Global Currency?

In an April 7 article in The London Telegraph titled “The G20 Moves the World a Step Closer to a Global Currency,” Ambrose Evans-Pritchard wrote:

“A single clause in Point 19 of the communiqué issued by the G20 leaders amounts to revolution in the global financial order.

“‘We have agreed to support a general SDR allocation which will inject $250bn (£170bn) into the world economy and increase global liquidity,’ it said. SDRs are Special Drawing Rights, a synthetic paper currency issued by the International Monetary Fund that has lain dormant for half a century.

“In effect, the G20 leaders have activated the IMF’s power to create money and begin global ‘quantitative easing’. In doing so, they are putting a de facto world currency into play. It is outside the control of any sovereign body. Conspiracy theorists will love it.”

Indeed they will. The article is subtitled, “The world is a step closer to a global currency, backed by a global central bank, running monetary policy for all humanity.” Which naturally raises the question, who or what will serve as this global central bank, cloaked with the power to issue the global currency and police monetary policy for all humanity? When the world’s central bankers met in Washington last September, they discussed what body might be in a position to serve in that awesome and fearful role. A former governor of the Bank of England stated:

“[T]he answer might already be staring us in the face, in the form of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). . . . The IMF tends to couch its warnings about economic problems in very diplomatic language, but the BIS is more independent and much better placed to deal with this if it is given the power to do so.”1

And if the vision of a global currency outside government control does not set off conspiracy theorists, putting the BIS in charge of it surely will. The BIS has been scandal-ridden ever since it was branded with pro-Nazi leanings in the 1930s. Founded in Basel, Switzerland, in 1930, the BIS has been called “the most exclusive, secretive, and powerful supranational club in the world.” Charles Higham wrote in his book Trading with the Enemy that by the late 1930s, the BIS had assumed an openly pro-Nazi bias, a theme that was expanded on in a BBC Timewatch film titled “Banking with Hitler” broadcast in 1998.2 In 1944, the American government backed a resolution at the Bretton-Woods Conference calling for the liquidation of the BIS, following Czech accusations that it was laundering gold stolen by the Nazis from occupied Europe; but the central bankers succeeded in quietly snuffing out the American resolution.3

In Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (1966), Dr. Carroll Quigley revealed the key role played in global finance by the BIS behind the scenes. Dr. Quigley was Professor of History at Georgetown University, where he was President Bill Clinton’s mentor. He was also an insider, groomed by the powerful clique he called “the international bankers.” His credibility is heightened by the fact that he actually espoused their goals. He wrote:

“I know of the operations of this network because I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960’s, to examine its papers and secret records. I have no aversion to it or to most of its aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and to many of its instruments. . . . [I]n general my chief difference of opinion is that it wishes to remain unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant enough to be known.”

Quigley wrote of this international banking network:

“[T]he powers of financial capitalism had another far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private meetings and conferences. The apex of the system was to be the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a private bank owned and controlled by the world’s central banks which were themselves private corporations.”

The key to their success, said Quigley, was that the international bankers would control and manipulate the money system of a nation while letting it appear to be controlled by the government. The statement echoed one made in the eighteenth century by the patriarch of what would become the most powerful banking dynasty in the world. Mayer Amschel Bauer Rothschild famously said in 1791:

“Allow me to issue and control a nation’s currency, and I care not who makes its laws.”

Mayer’s five sons were sent to the major capitals of Europe – London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Naples – with the mission of establishing a banking system that would be outside government control. The economic and political systems of nations would be controlled not by citizens but by bankers, for the benefit of bankers. Eventually, a privately-owned “central bank” was established in nearly every country; and this central banking system has now gained control over the economies of the world. Central banks have the authority to print money in their respective countries, and it is from these banks that governments must borrow money to pay their debts and fund their operations. The result is a global economy in which not only industry but government itself runs on “credit” (or debt) created by a banking monopoly headed by a network of private central banks; and at the top of this network is the BIS, the “central bank of central banks” in Basel.

BEHIND THE CURTAIN

For many years the BIS kept a very low profile, operating behind the scenes in an abandoned hotel. It was here that decisions were reached to devalue or defend currencies, fix the price of gold, regulate offshore banking, and raise or lower short-term interest rates. In 1977, however, the BIS gave up its anonymity in exchange for more efficient headquarters. The new building has been described as “an eighteen story-high circular skyscraper that rises above the medieval city like some misplaced nuclear reactor.” It quickly became known as the “Tower of Basel.” Today the BIS has governmental immunity, pays no taxes, and has its own private police force.4 It is, as Mayer Rothschild envisioned, above the law.

The BIS is now composed of 55 member nations, but the club that meets regularly in Basel is a much smaller group; and even within it, there is a hierarchy. In a 1983 article in Harper’s Magazine called “Ruling the World of Money,” Edward Jay Epstein wrote that where the real business gets done is in “a sort of inner club made up of the half dozen or so powerful central bankers who find themselves more or less in the same monetary boat” – those from Germany, the United States, Switzerland, Italy, Japan and England. Epstein said:

“The prime value, which also seems to demarcate the inner club from the rest of the BIS members, is the firm belief that central banks should act independently of their home governments. . . . A second and closely related belief of the inner club is that politicians should not be trusted to decide the fate of the international monetary system.”

In 1974, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was created by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten nations (now expanded to twenty). The BIS provides the twelve-member Secretariat for the Committee. The Committee, in turn, sets the rules for banking globally, including capital requirements and reserve controls. In a 2003 article titled “The Bank for International Settlements Calls for Global Currency,” Joan Veon wrote:

“The BIS is where all of the world’s central banks meet to analyze the global economy and determine what course of action they will take next to put more money in their pockets, since they control the amount of money in circulation and how much interest they are going to charge governments and banks for borrowing from them. . . .

“When you understand that the BIS pulls the strings of the world’s monetary system, you then understand that they have the ability to create a financial boom or bust in a country. If that country is not doing what the money lenders want, then all they have to do is sell its currency.”5

THE CONTROVERSIAL BASEL ACCORDS

The power of the BIS to make or break economies was demonstrated in 1988, when it issued a Basel Accord raising bank capital requirements from 6% to 8%. By then, Japan had emerged as the world’s largest creditor; but Japan’s banks were less well capitalized than other major international banks. Raising the capital requirement forced them to cut back on lending, creating a recession in Japan like that suffered in the U.S. today. Property prices fell and loans went into default as the security for them shriveled up. A downward spiral followed, ending with the total bankruptcy of the banks. The banks had to be nationalized, although that word was not used in order to avoid criticism.6

Among other collateral damage produced by the Basel Accords was a spate of suicides among Indian farmers unable to get loans. The BIS capital adequacy standards required loans to private borrowers to be “risk-weighted,” with the degree of risk determined by private rating agencies; and farmers and small business owners could not afford the agencies’ fees. Banks therefore assigned 100 percent risk to the loans, and then resisted extending credit to these “high-risk” borrowers because more capital was required to cover the loans. When the conscience of the nation was aroused by the Indian suicides, the government, lamenting the neglect of farmers by commercial banks, established a policy of ending the “financial exclusion” of the weak; but this step had little real effect on lending practices, due largely to the strictures imposed by the BIS from abroad.7

Similar complaints have come from Korea. An article in the December 12, 2008 Korea Times titled “BIS Calls Trigger Vicious Cycle” described how Korean entrepreneurs with good collateral cannot get operational loans from Korean banks, at a time when the economic downturn requires increased investment and easier credit:

“‘The Bank of Korea has provided more than 35 trillion won to banks since September when the global financial crisis went full throttle,’ said a Seoul analyst, who declined to be named. ‘But the effect is not seen at all with the banks keeping the liquidity in their safes. They simply don’t lend and one of the biggest reasons is to keep the BIS ratio high enough to survive,’ he said. . . .

“Chang Ha-joon, an economics professor at Cambridge University, concurs with the analyst. ‘What banks do for their own interests, or to improve the BIS ratio, is against the interests of the whole society. This is a bad idea,’ Chang said in a recent telephone interview with Korea Times.”

In a May 2002 article in The Asia Times titled “Global Economy: The BIS vs. National Banks,” economist Henry C K Liu observed that the Basel Accords have forced national banking systems “to march to the same tune, designed to serve the needs of highly sophisticated global financial markets, regardless of the developmental needs of their national economies.” He wrote:

“[N]ational banking systems are suddenly thrown into the rigid arms of the Basel Capital Accord sponsored by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), or to face the penalty of usurious risk premium in securing international interbank loans. . . . National policies suddenly are subjected to profit incentives of private financial institutions, all members of a hierarchical system controlled and directed from the money center banks in New York. The result is to force national banking systems to privatize . . . .

“BIS regulations serve only the single purpose of strengthening the international private banking system, even at the peril of national economies. . . . The IMF and the international banks regulated by the BIS are a team: the international banks lend recklessly to borrowers in emerging economies to create a foreign currency debt crisis, the IMF arrives as a carrier of monetary virus in the name of sound monetary policy, then the international banks come as vulture investors in the name of financial rescue to acquire national banks deemed capital inadequate and insolvent by the BIS.”

Ironically, noted Liu, developing countries with their own natural resources did not actually need the foreign investment that trapped them in debt to outsiders:

“Applying the State Theory of Money [which assumes that a sovereign nation has the power to issue its own money], any government can fund with its own currency all its domestic developmental needs to maintain full employment without inflation.”

When governments fall into the trap of accepting loans in foreign currencies, however, they become “debtor nations” subject to IMF and BIS regulation. They are forced to divert their production to exports, just to earn the foreign currency necessary to pay the interest on their loans. National banks deemed “capital inadequate” have to deal with strictures comparable to the “conditionalities” imposed by the IMF on debtor nations: “escalating capital requirement, loan writeoffs and liquidation, and restructuring through selloffs, layoffs, downsizing, cost-cutting and freeze on capital spending.” Liu wrote:

“Reversing the logic that a sound banking system should lead to full employment and developmental growth, BIS regulations demand high unemployment and developmental degradation in national economies as the fair price for a sound global private banking system.”

THE LAST DOMINO TO FALL?

While banks in developing nations were being penalized for falling short of the BIS capital requirements, large international banks managed to escape the rules, although they actually carried enormous risk because of their derivative exposure. The mega-banks succeeded in avoiding the Basel rules by separating the “risk” of default out from the loans and selling it off to investors, using a form of derivative known as “credit default swaps.”

However, it was not in the game plan that U.S. banks should escape the BIS net. When they managed to sidestep the first Basel Accord, a second set of rules was imposed known as Basel II. The new rules were established in 2004, but they were not levied on U.S. banks until November 2007, the month after the Dow passed 14,000 to reach its all-time high. It has been all downhill from there. Basel II had the same effect on U.S. banks that Basel I had on Japanese banks: they have been struggling ever since to survive.8

Basel II requires banks to adjust the value of their marketable securities to the “market price” of the security, a rule called “mark to market.”9 The rule has theoretical merit, but the problem is timing: it was imposed ex post facto, after the banks already had the hard-to-market assets on their books. Lenders that had been considered sufficiently well capitalized to make new loans suddenly found they were insolvent. At least, they would have been insolvent if they had tried to sell their assets, an assumption required by the new rule. Financial analyst John Berlau complained:

“The crisis is often called a ‘market failure,’ and the term ‘mark-to-market’ seems to reinforce that. But the mark-to-market rules are profoundly anti-market and hinder the free-market function of price discovery. . . . In this case, the accounting rules fail to allow the market players to hold on to an asset if they don’t like what the market is currently fetching, an important market action that affects price discovery in areas from agriculture to antiques.”10

Imposing the mark-to-market rule on U.S. banks caused an instant credit freeze, which proceeded to take down the economies not only of the U.S. but of countries worldwide. In early April 2009, the mark-to-market rule was finally softened by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB); but critics said the modification did not go far enough, and it was done in response to pressure from politicians and bankers, not out of any fundamental change of heart or policies by the BIS.

And that is where the conspiracy theorists come in. Why did the BIS not retract or at least modify Basel II after seeing the devastation it had caused? Why did it sit idly by as the global economy came crashing down? Was the goal to create so much economic havoc that the world would rush with relief into the waiting arms of the BIS with its privately-created global currency? The plot thickens . . . .

Originally posted on Global Research on April 18, 2009.

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1. Andrew Marshall, “The Financial New World Order: Towards a Global Currency and World Government,” Global Research (April 6, 2009).

2. Alfred Mendez, “The Network,” in “The World Central Bank: The Bank for International Settlements.”

3. “BIS – Bank of International Settlement: The Mother of All Central Banks,” Hubpages (2009).

4. Ibid.

5. Joan Veon, “The Bank for International Settlements Calls for Global Currency,” News with Views (August 26, 2003).

6. Peter Myers, “The 1988 Basle Accord – Destroyer of Japan’s Finance System” (updated September 9, 2008).

7. Nirmal Chandra, “Is Inclusive Growth Feasible in Neoliberal India?”, Network Ideas (September 2008).

8. Bruce Wiseman, “The Financial Crisis: A look Behind the Wizard’s Curtain,” Canada Free Press (March 19, 2009).

9. See Ellen Brown, “Credit Where Credit Is Due,” webofdebt.com/articles/creditcrunch.php (January 11, 2009).

10. John Berlau, “The International Mark-to-market Contagion,” Open Market (October 10, 2008).

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Eastern European Banking Model

A traditional banking model in a CEEC (Central and Eastern European Country) consisted of a central bank and several purpose banks, one dealing with individuals’ savings and other banking needs, and another focusing on foreign financial activities, etc. The central bank provided most of the commercial banking needs of enterprises in addition to other functions. During the late 1980s, the CEECs modified this earlier structure by taking all the commercial banking activities of the central bank and transferring them to new commercial banks. In most countries the new banks were set up along industry lines, although in Poland a regional approach has been adopted.

On the whole, these new stale-owned commercial banks controlled the bulk of financial transactions, although a few ‘de novo banks’ were allowed in Hungary and Poland. Simply transferring existing loans from the central bank to the new state-owned commercial banks had its problems, since it involved transferring both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ assets. Moreover, each bank’s portfolio was restricted to the enterprise and industry assigned to them and they were not allowed to deal with other enterprises outside their remit.

As the central banks would always ‘bale out’ troubled state enterprises, these commercial banks cannot play the same role as commercial banks in the West. CEEC commercial banks cannot foreclose on a debt. If a firm did not wish to pay, the state-owned enterprise would, historically, receive further finance to cover its difficulties, it was a very rare occurrence for a bank to bring about the bankruptcy of a firm. In other words, state-owned enterprises were not allowed to go bankrupt, primarily because it would have affected the commercial banks, balance sheets, but more importantly, the rise in unemployment that would follow might have had high political costs.

What was needed was for commercial banks to have their balance sheets ‘cleaned up’, perhaps by the government purchasing their bad loans with long-term bonds. Adopting Western accounting procedures might also benefit the new commercial banks.

This picture of state-controlled commercial banks has begun to change during the mid to late 1990s as the CEECs began to appreciate that the move towards market-based economies required a vibrant commercial banking sector. There are still a number of issues lo be addressed in this sector, however. For example, in the Czech Republic the government has promised to privatize the banking sector beginning in 1998. Currently the banking sector suffers from a number of weaknesses. A number of the smaller hanks appear to be facing difficulties as money market competition picks up, highlighting their tinder-capitalization and the greater amount of higher-risk business in which they are involved. There have also been issues concerning banking sector regulation and the control mechanisms that are available. This has resulted in the government’s proposal for an independent securities commission to regulate capital markets.

The privatization package for the Czech Republic’s four largest banks, which currently control about 60 percent of the sector’s assets, will also allow foreign banks into a highly developed market where their influence has been marginal until now. It is anticipated that each of the four banks will be sold to a single bidder in an attempt to create a regional hub of a foreign bank’s network. One problem with all four banks is that inspection of their balance sheets may throw up problems which could reduce the size of any bid. All four banks have at least 20 percent of their loans as classified, where no interest has been paid for 30 days or more. Banks could make provisions to reduce these loans by collateral held against them, but in some cases the loans exceed the collateral. Moreover, getting an accurate picture of the value of the collateral is difficult since bankruptcy legislation is ineffective. The ability to write off these bad debts was not permitted until 1996, but even if this route is taken then this will eat into the banks’ assets, leaving them very close to the lower limit of 8 percent capital adequacy ratio. In addition, the ‘commercial’ banks have been influenced by the action of the national bank, which in early 1997 caused bond prices to fall, leading to a fall in the commercial banks’ bond portfolios. Thus the banking sector in the Czech Republic still has a long way to go.

In Hungary the privatization of the banking sector is almost complete. However, a state rescue package had to be agreed at the beginning of 1997 for the second-largest state bank, Postabank, owned indirectly by the main social security bodies and the post office, and this indicates the fragility of this sector. Outside of the difficulties experienced with Postabank, the Hungarian banking system has been transformed. The rapid move towards privatization resulted from the problems experienced by the state-owned banks, which the government bad to bail out, costing it around 7 percent of GDP. At that stage it was possible that the banking system could collapse and government funding, although saving the banks, did not solve the problems of corporate governance or moral hazard. Thus the privatization process was started in earnest. Magyar Kulkereskedelmi Bank (MKB) was sold to Bayerische Landesbank and the EBDR in 1994, Budapest Bank was bought by GE Capital and Magyar Hitel Bank was bought by ABN-AMRO. In November 1997 the state completed the last stage of the sale of the state savings bank (OTP), Hungary’s largest bank. The state, which dominated the banking system three years ago, now only retains a majority stake in two specialist banks, the Hungarian Development Bank and Eximbank.

The move towards, and success of privatization can be seen in the balance sheets of the banks, which showed an increase in post-tax profits of 45 percent in 1996. These banks are also seeing higher savings and deposits and a strong rise in demand for corporate and retail lending. In addition, the growth in competition in the banking sector has led to a narrowing of the spreads between lending and deposit rates, and the further knock-on effect of mergers and small-hank closures. Over 50 percent of Hungarian bank assets are controlled by foreign-owned banks, and this has led to Hungarian banks offering services similar to those expected in many Western European countries. Most of the foreign-owned but mainly Hungarian-managed banks were recapitalized after their acquisition and they have spent heavily on staff training and new information technology systems. From 1998, foreign banks will be free to open branches in Hungary, thus opening up the domestic banking market to full competition.

As a whole, the CEECs have come a long way since the early 1990s in dealing with their banking problems. For some countries the process of privatization still has a long way to go but others such as Hungary have moved quickly along the process of transforming their banking systems in readiness for their entry into the EU.

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Universal Banking – Answer For The Best Banking Design?

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, universal banking has been growing its popularity in Indonesia. Mandiri Bank, for example, has taken strategy to become Indonesia’s universal bank; this bank has also initiated to develop an integrated financial risk system in terms of sounding financial performance and increasing shareholder value. In Germany, and most developed countries in Europe, universal banks have initiated its operations since nineteen century. There is mounting evidence that in those countries, universal banks have taken an important part in the development of real sectors and the financial system. In those countries, the growing numbers of universal banking practices are really supported by the regulation of central of bank.

Despite, in The United States, they are strict to regulate universal banks by blocking commercial banks from engaging in securities and stock markets practices. They argued that the practice of universal banking might be harmful for the financial system. ((Boyd et.al, 1998) cited in Cheang, 2004) The “risk” might be the key reason why the central bank of The U.S is worried about the universal banking system. Since, if the central of bank allowed banks to adjust their operation to be universal banks, the relationship among, banks, financial and stock markets would be closer. Consequently, this would give an uncertainty to the banks condition and performance. For example, if there were a disaster in stock market, banks would get problems in their financial positions. Thus, they would tend to be insolvent.

In addition universal banks would also threaten the market share of other specialized institutions, because more customers would choose universal banks that offer more option to their investment. Hence, more specialized institutions are likely to be ruined in the U.S financial industry.

One majoring factor, which is triggering a bank to be universal bank, is to increase the profit by enlarging their market share. According to João A. C. Santos (1998) universal bank itself can be defined as the financial institution, which enlarges its service range in terms of offering a variety of financial products and services in one site. Thus, by operating universal banking, banks could get a greater opportunity to expand to another financial area, such as : financial securities, insurance, hedge funds and etc.

Although the trend of banks has recently tended to universal banks, it is undoubtedly true that universal banks would also face further risks because a wide range of financial services is strongly associated with increasing risks and escalating monitoring costs. These are the major concerns why banks have to implement more advance technology in terms of financial risk management. Moreover, the practices of universal banks would cause significant risks to economy’s payment system. Since, the operation of universal banks connects closely to the financial and stock markets that are very fluctuate in a short term.

To win in the tight competition among financial institutions, banks have to alter their maneuver to lead in the market. Universal bank could be the wise choice for the bank manager, because they can attract more customers with a wide range of services. Furthermore, by altering their operation to the universal banking system, banks would get benefits from the efficiency and economies of scale.

In order to understand about the universal banking practices, this paper would examine the exclusive matters, which related to the risks and benefits in a universal bank. Moreover, this paper would also focus the whole impact of this institution to the financial system and the economy as a whole.

1.2 PROFITS AND COSTS IN UNIVERSAL BANKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL BANKS

General problem related to financial intermediation, include universal banks and another type of banks, is about asymmetric information . It is the main problem that causes costs to increase and influence the performance of financial institutions. In Universal banks, the problems that would increase are slightly different with specialized banks; they are similar in that they should cope the risks problem associated with their financial position. Although, in universal banks, the risks are more bigger due to the wide range of financial instruments that they organized. Therefore, banks have to increase their spending on monitoring costs that are more complicated than specialized institutions or conventional banks.

Possible answer why more banks sacrifice to the escalating risks and transform it operation into the universal banking is that they want to compete and expand their market share, in order to seek a greater opportunity profits by serving more choices to their customers. Many banks has experienced a great performance after they alter their operation, the main concerns are that they could reach better economies of scale which can reduce the amount of spending in operational costs and also a greater opportunity to get more profits. The research finding which was conducted by Vender, R. (2002, cited in Cheang, 2004) about the efficiency of revenue in financial conglomerates and the level of both profit and cost in universal banking, has proved that both financial conglomerates and universal banking contain good performance in several indicators of bank profitability. His finding also suggests that the sustained expansion of financial conglomerates and universal banking practices may increase efficiency in the financial system.

This opinion is strengthen by another experts, like : George Rich and Christian Walter (1993). They state that universal banks which posse benefits over specialized institutions, are able to take advantage of reduction in the average cost of production and scope in banking. It is essential for banks that operate on a international level and in order to fulfill customer needs with a variety of financial services. They also mention a classic example how universal banks in some countries, such as : Switzerland, Germany and more European countries has experienced benefits by operating universal banking. In addition, they also state that the fear if universal bank would threaten specialized institutions has not proven. In Switzerland and Germany, for example, specialized institutions could achieve a better improvement in terms of cooperating with big banks. Universal banks are one of potential market channel which can sell their products directly to the customers, so specialized institutions also get additional return due to the increases in the number of universal banks. Therefore, this proves that universal banks do not threat other institutions; in fact, they support specialized institutions to market their products.

According to Fohlin, universal banking would lead to a bank’s concentration due to the increases the number of branch. Based on Germany’s experience, such branching-based expansion has led to the efficiency in banking because it could increase economies of scale in advertising and marketing, and open an enormous opportunity to enhance diversification and steadiness for banks.

A universal bank has unique position to tackle asymmetric information. As stated by Joao A. C. Santos (1998), that a universal bank has potential benefits on the reduction of agency cost and acquires profits due to information advantages. Although in other sides, universal banking also face problems related to the cost, conflict of interest and safety and soundness. But the default risk, which is generally happened in financial intermediation, would decrease substantially because universal banks are easier to control over their customers. Most of lenders in universal banks are their customers, so they can understand about the capacity of the customers from the information that they gather.

Nicholas Cheang (2004) also points out how universal banks could reduce a crucial problem in financial institution, asymmetric information. He argued that they could preserve a close relationship with their borrowers, by gathering more relevant information to make an important decision for investment. Their advantageous positions also vital to optimize the distribution of fund allocation, because banks have already known which investment that would give more margins to them. So, they don’t need to worry too much about the risk.

1.3 UNIVERSAL BANKS AND THE STABILITY IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Financial institution plays a vital role in terms of mobilizing funds in the economy. Consequently, stability in financial system is really important to manage by government in order to prevent wider implications to the real sectors. Financial disasters which happened in most countries in Asia in 1997 are the classic examples how importance to save banks to recover the economy.

As the financial supermarkets, which are handling a variety of financial instruments, they must face a greater risk than specialized institutions. As a consequence, this institution needs to be monitored closely in order to prevent more implications to the economy. According to Benston (1994), the escalating risks in universal banking would lead to a great problem because it can cause generous distress in the financial system. Hence, it will greatly increase the risk to the economy’s payment system. In another term, Rime and Strioh (2001) who examine the financial system in Switzerland in which universal banking are becoming more important in this country, state that difficulty in monitoring large universal banks is a major concern. This is the reason why universal bank has to spend more money in monitoring cost and develop an advanced system in information technology. In other words, it could say that the consequence of inefficient monitoring could lead to financial instability. (Cheang, 2004)

A wider range of universal banks in financial system makes the fund channels of banks to the customer are larger than specialized institutions. So, the economy will improve because universal banks will support more funding. This can be seen by the fact that a universal bank practice in Germany has triggered the progress of some enterprises performance in this country. (Stiglitz, 1985). It is understandable that when the allocation of fund can distribute widely and effectively to the potential enterprises, the economy will improve. In this context, universal banks have played as the key institution which mobilize fund to the potential lender.

Edwards (1996), has also proved that a universal bank is not just significantly contributed to economy from the external funds that they provide, but also from the improvement of the information flows. (cited in Cheang, 2004) Therefore, this proves that universal banks have played a significant role in terms of reducing the default risk by providing important information about the lender or customers. Furthermore, the safety of the financial system would be improved by the existence of universal banks.

1.4 CONCLUSION

The development of universal banks has to in line with the policy direction of central bank, because it is important to keep the stability of financial system and the economy as whole. There are three important areas that must be concerned related to universal bank operations, such as : the strengthened of capital and advanced risk management system. Consequently, in order to manage universal bank, people need to be aware about the unique of the risk type in universal banking. Furthermore, policy maker must also consider about the implication of universal banks in financial system.

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